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CONSTITUTIONAL VOICES
Dr PG McHugh'
This article is about governing the country. It draws in particular on the writing of James
Tully and Judith Binney to illuminate how our constitutional#amework and national mind-set
need not be monoform and narrowly focused, as the Anglo-settler state has tended to suggest.
Instead, the Crown has been required to take account of other forces especially Maori demands.
This is leading to an emergent -constitutionalism", founded on a willingness to listen to the
range of "constitutional voices".
I INTRODUCTION
This article is about what here is being called "constitutionalism", meaning the ways in
which the members of a polity think about, talk of and respond to their arrangements of
governance. Since "men think by communicating language systems; these systems help
constitute both their conceptual worlds and the authority structures, or social worlds,
related to these; the conceptual and social worlds may be seen as a context to the other."1
The individual's thinking is then viewed "as a social event, an act of communication and of
response within a paradigm-system, and as a historical event, a moment in a process of
transformation of that system and of the interacting worlds which both system and act help
to constifute and are constituted by".2 These speech-acts concerning the character of
governance (in our case the Anglo-settler polity of New Zealand) constitute a social and
historical formation or "discourse". This discourse is conducted within a public domain
with its own set of demands and institutional forms and in that location occurs as a series
of interactive speech-acts the form of which is shaped by previous utterances. In their turn
those speech-acts affect the character of those which will be made in the future.3 Thus we
can talk of "constitutionalism" as a discourse about the character of governance.
* Tutor of Sidney Sussex College and Lecturer in Law, University of Cambridge.
1 JGA Pocock "Languages and their implications: the transformation of the study of political thought" in Politics,
Language and Time. Essays on Political Thought and History (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1971) 3, 15.
2 Above n 1.
3 See, for example, A Pagden "Introduction" to Pagden (ed) The languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern
Europe (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987) 1. Also JGA Pocock 'The concept of a language and the
metier d'historien: some considerations on practice", above n 1, 19.
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This type of discourse known very generally as "constitutionalism" is based upon an
underlying and enduring notion that authority within a political association is limited
either customarily or constitutively.4 The central question of discourse then becomes the
location and nature of this limited (constitutional) authority within the polity. The polity
which this article considers is the Anglo-settler state of New Zealand wherein the
character of the Treaty of Waitangi has become an important matter of political discourse
and in respect of which the two most central idioms of that discourse have been "law" and
"history'.
The discussion is rather composite in character and following this Introduction divides
into three major Parts. Part II considers James Tully's important book Strange multiplicity:
Constitutionalism in an age qf diversity (1995) and its critique of "modern" constitutionalism.
Drawing mainly on Canadian examples Tully attempts to retrieve a constitutional
tradition, which, unlike the "modern" and however suppressed it may have been, welcomes
and facilitates constitutional diversity. Tully's description of the contours of "modern"
constitutionalism sets the scene for the writer's complementary account Part III's condensed
version of a lengthier working paper I have written entitled "Law, History and the Treaty
of Waitangi" and recently presented to the Conference for the Study of Political Thought at
Tulane University, New Orleans, in March 1996. That paper in turn is part of an inter-
disciplinary project provisionally known as Encountering Histories. Part IV of this article
will then explore the themes of Parts II and III in the New Zealand setting. In particular,
that Part willlook at the aftermath of the state enterprise cases in the Court of Appeal now
nearly a decade ago and Judith Binney's stunning tour de force Redemption Songs: A Life of
Te Kooti Arikirangi Te Turuki.
From that discussion the suggestion will emerge that constitutionalism in New
Zealand/Aotearoa is today a highly vocalised discourse, the intensity of which is
augmented by geographical proximity or, more simply, the fact that New Zealanders must
live together in a small territorial space. The political domain has become one where
diverse voices (which in larger polities might not be heard) present demands for recognition
and accommodation within a polity no longer able or willing to sustain its (legal and
historical) fictions of harmony and homogeneity. Maori claims are an obvious example of
that pressure upon constitutionalism in New Zealand today, but other features such as the
fractionalisation (not to say factionalisation) of the party political system and the
introduction of proportional representation are also symptomatic of the constitutional
cabin fever from which national discourse is groping for relief. The challenge has become
one of finding mechanisms through which diverse voices are heard, their interests and
4 CH McI[wain Constitutionalism Ancient and Modern (revised edition, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press,
1966) 21-22.
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claims weighed and put into the general political calculation. That emergent form of
discourse - one highly vocalised and ritualised - is hardly a new phenomenon on these
islands. It resembles an indigenous form, one more Maori than Anglocentric in character.
That theme of an "indigenization of discourse" will become a speculative conclusion of this
article.
Although this article is in a sense composite, its underlying purpose is to explore the
epistemic and historiographical properties of Anglo-settler constitutionalism in
contemporary New Zealand. This is not specifically an inquiry into doctrine, though that
will have much to do with it. Rather, it attempts to identify the processes through which
constitutional meaning has been generated and interpreted in the Anglo-settler state of New
Zealand in consequence of what has been the singlemost cause for thejin de siDcle revival of
New Zealand/Aotearoa constitutionalism - the claims of the indigenous Maori tribes under
the Treaty of Waitangi.
A recurring theme will become plain as this article progresses. It is that New
Zealanders have been reared to think in terms of a constitutional Leviathan,5 the Crown-in-
Parliament, an absolutist and singularised if beneficient concept of authority importing the
domesticated pacification of the public space and supposing the cultural uniformity of an
undifferentiated population. In describing the power of the Crown-in-Parliament as
absolute this is only to say that there is in orthodox Diceyan constitutional theory an
absence of legal limitation upon what Parliament may do. Dicey was quite clear that there
were limitations upon what Parliament could and would do but those he described as extra-
legal.6
James Tully's recent book Strange Multiplicity shows that Hobbesian approach to
Crown sovereignty is a "modern" view of governance by law and, it will be argued, one
which has dominated Anglo-settler constitutionalism for the past century. Indeed so
powerful has been its thrall, so warm its comfort, that it remains difficult for those situated
within the discourse of the Anglo-settler polity to conceive of governance outside the
"modern" form.
5 So named by Thomas Hobbes in Imiathan, or The Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-wealth Ecdesiasticall and
Civill (1651, reprint ed, London, Penguin Books, 1961). As for the influence of Hobbes in English
constitutionalism see M Francis "The Nineteenth Century Theory of Sovereignty and Thomas Hobbes" [1980]
History of Political Thought 517; and in New Zealand A Sharp Justice and the Maori. Maori Claims in New
Zealand Political Argument in the 1980s (Auckland, Oxford University Press, 1990) 250 and GWR Palmer New
Zealand's Constitution in Crisis - Reforming our Political System (Dunedin, McIndoe, 1992) 42-4 decrying "the
unfortunate influence of Thomas Hobbes".
6 AV Dicey An Introduction to the Law of the Constitution (10th ed, London, Macmillan & Co, 1959) 39-85.
502 (1996) 26 VUWLR
Maori claims under the Treaty of Waitangi are a challenge to "modern"
constitutionalism. They test its monocultural uniformity and elimination of diversity, or
what Tully calls its "monologic" tendency. In asserting lino rangatiratango Maori posit the
existence of a legitimate source of authority within a constitutional association or polity
independent of the licence of the Crown.
"Modern" constitutionalism, the character of which will soon be amplified, either
dismisses rangatiratanga (the "old school" approach typical of pre-1980s' scholarship on the
Treaty of Waitangi) or struggles with it. The struggle often occurs as a somewhat
exasperated demonstration of the incompatibility of rangatiratanga with "modern"
constifutional form. That demonstration sometimes goes on to become an attempt to paper
over the tension between rangatiratanga and "modern" constitutionalism by displaying the
means through which the latter might adapt as to incorporate if but partially the former.
Chapter 2 of The Maori Magna Carta is probably the foremost example of an attempt to
reconcile rangatiratanga with "modern" Anglo-settler constitutionalism. However the
argument that Leviathan can be bicultural is never convincing, as that chapter itself shows
in revealing the doctrinal difficulties that arise in trying to depict the Treaty of Waitangi as
somehow limiting or dividing the Crown's sovereignty over New Zealand.7 However useful
the attempt might be in clarifying the limits of Anglo-settler constitutional orthodoxy,
ultimately the juxtaposition becomes a demonstration of modernism's impotence in the face of
the diversity to which it can only respond by seeking to silence. Rangatiratanga and
sovereignty: square peg into round hole.8
One response to that stand-off between Anglo-settler constitutionalism's sovereignty on
the one hand and rangatiratango on the other has been to project a time when that (present)
incompatibility might dissolve. Since doctrinal contortionism cannot perform an act of
mutual accommodation, this response speculates that perhaps another generation will
succeed in the same exercise. That, indeed, is the prospect offered by The Maori Magna
CarlaY
That argument can be seen in the first place as an apologetic excuse-making tactic which
sandbags modernism by a shifting of constitutional responsibility into the future:
Leviathan's authority might not now be limited or shared with the Maori tribes, the
argument runs, but that may occur in the future as political life moves de facto to such a
position. Quite apart from its deferral of constitutional responsibility - contestable in
7 PG McHugh The Maori Magna Carta: New Zealand Law ami the Treaty of Waitangi (Auckland, Oxford
University Press, 1991) 45-63.
8 Also IH Kawharu "Sovereignty vs Rangatiratanga" (unpublished paper presented to the Waitangi Tribunal
during the Kaituna River claim, July 1984).
9 Above n 7,63-65.
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itself -, that argument is straying so far from the modernist compound as to be outside its
precincts altogether. It suggests a time in national political life when constitutional
authority has been dispersed from its present concentrated, unitary source or, more
technically, a time when the grundnorm (crudely, the fundamental political fact upon which
governance by law is based)10 describes a limitation and division of Crown sovereignty.
The contention is that at some stage the legal system may be required to articulate de jure
what has already occurred de facto.
The modernist (as we will see Tully demonstrating) views fragmented constitutional
form as historically retrogressive and fundamentally at odds with the unified and
centralised character of sovereignty. Criticism of the "rangatiratanga as a constitutional
momentum" argument or grundnorm motile (as it has been disparagingly termed)11 reveals
modernism's abhorrence of a haemorrhaging of political authority. Defenders of the
modernist constitution cannot contemplate a form of sovereignty or means of organising
ultimate political authority which is not concentrated and unitary in character.12
Modernists adopt the position that any change in the location of sovereignty can only be
revolutionary and (either) successive or secessive.13 It cannot be fissionary. In other
words, modernists insist political authority once concentrated cannot be
(re-)dispersed into the polity so much as replaced or partitioned by a deliberative act of
those comprising or opposing the association. Rangatirotanga entails neither a usurping of
Leviathan nor secession (though extreme Maori rhetoric can go that far)14, the two means
by which Kelsenian modernists conceive movement of the grundnorm. A grundnorm motile
contemplating the dispersal of sovereign power is directly at odds with those vital precepts
of modernism.
10 HWR Wade 'The Basis of Legal Sovereignty" [1955] CLJ 172, 187 noting the correspondence of his approach
with Kelsen who devised the term grundnorm (General Theory of Law and State (1945) at 110-24, 131-4, 369-73
and 395-6). Hart's "rule of recognition" differs from Kelsen's grundnorm in stressing that what the criteria of
legal validity in any legal system are is a question of fact: The Concept of Low (Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 1961) 245.
11 A Frame Salmond: Southern Iurist (Wellington, Victoria University Press, 1995) 66, n 58. Frame's Hobbesian
modernism is disclosed by the title of his article "A State Servant Looks at the Treaty" (1990-1) 14 NZULR 82
[emphasis added].
12 See A Sharp, above n 5, 270-1 for a similar observation (directed against the author's earlier work which then
was standing quite deliberately within the orthodox Diceyan compound).
13 Sir John Salmond is a paradigmatic example: Junsprudence: or the Theory of Law (7 ed, London, Stevens and
Haynes, 1893) 154-5 (and cited by Frame Southern /urist, above n 11, 66) although that modernist outlook is
tempered in later editions, for instance PJ Fitzgerald (ed) Salm£md on Jurisprudence (12 ed, London, Sweet and
Maxwell, 1966) 83-7. This predicate underlies FM Brookfield "Kelsen, the Constitution and the Treaty" (1992)
15 NZULR 163 (although Professor Brookfield does not comment on the motile argument).
14 See Sharp, above n 5, 249-265.
504 (1996) 26 VUWLR
There is a weakness in the modernists' reaction to the suggestion that the political facts
underlying the national grundnorm may be realigning in response to Treaty claims. That
failing lies in modernism's perception of the cultural uniformity of the national polity,
something which in New Zealand the continued reality of tribal organisation and
rangatiratanga itself defies. In other words, Kelsen's model of constitutional change and
sovereign identity has no responsiveness to cultural diversity other than to see it implicitly
as a competition for dominance waged between self-contained sovereign or proto-sovereign
entities within a single (or severable) space.
It can be seen already, then, that the gravitational pull of constitutionalism in New
Zealand has been towards a totalising, all-encompassing form founded upon a denial of
cultural diversity. That tendency represents the forces of what Tully calls "modern"
constitutionalism or what I will later describe as a local offspring from a late nineteenth
century collusion of law and history, or, in short an Anglo-settler Whig apotheosis.
II "MODERN" CONSTITUTIONALISM'S "EMPIRE OF UNIFORMITY":
JAMES TULLY3 STRANGE MULTIPLICITY (1995)
James Tully's Strange Multiplicity echoes with the Canadian background of its author
through the examples he most frequently uses, namely the claims of Canadian First Nations
and Quebec. However, his view of constitutionalism in an age of diversity holds particular
resonance for New Zealand and provides a fine and important means to assess
constitutional and political life in the country, most especially (but not only) the
significance of Maori claims. It is likely that public law will in the future be taught in New
Zealand law schools through this text and its exposition of the means through which
Leviathan, or what Tully calls "the empire of uniformity", has maintained its will.
Tully starts from the position that cultural identity is and has always been overlapping,
open and negotiated. That is, an individual's sense of who and what they are is never fixed
and closed but subject to questioning, contestation and renegotiation. "Modern"
constitutionalism, with its notion of identity as fixed and closed, is distinguished from
"contemporary" constitutionalism. The former has "a habitual imperial stance"15 and
through its language has acquired a narrow range of normal usage over the course of the
past three centuries. That range comprises three "schools" or means of expression, namely
liberalism, nationalism and communitarianism. "Modern" constitutionalism has elbowed
aside entire areas of the broader language of constitutionalism, Tully argues, but despite
constraint those can never be silenced simply because difference is a fundamental human
trait. The claims of the Canadian First Nations are given as an example of how
"contemporary" constitutionalism is composed of both the dominant modernism as well as
15 J Tully Strange multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an age ef diversity (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1995) 24.
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the voices of formerly suppressed or stifled constitutions which are appropriating and
reorienting the"modern" language as a means of asserting political identity. Thus "modem"
constitutionalism may have an excluding and strangulating tendency but its voice is never
(and has never been) wholly exclusive: difference refuses to suffocate.
Tully proceeds to demonstrate how "modern" constitutionalism's three main traditions
postulate a culturally homogeneous and sovereign people establishing a constitution as a
form of critical negotiation or, in other words, an act of quasi-corporate will. This
supposition of cultural homogeneity occurs in any of three ways: as a society of
undifferentiated individuals (liberalism), a community held together by the common good
(communitarianism) or a culturally-defined nation (nationalism). Be it an association of
individuals, a nation or a community the "modern ./constitution founds an independent and
self-governing nation state with a set of uniform legal and representative institutions in
which all citizens are treated equally".16 This "empire of uniformity" becomes the
desiderata of "modern" constitutionalism and history is conceived as establishing laws of
progression towards the "modern" (liberal democratic) form. Thus, Tully says, "the
language of modem constitutionalism which has come to be authoritative was designed to
exclude or assimilate cultural diversity and justify uniformity".17
Tully then identifies the seven features integral to "modern" constitutionalism and its
symbiosis of ideology and political practice: "The vision of modern constitutionalism
legitimates the modemizing processes of discipline, rationalization and state-building that
are designed to create in practice the cultural and institutional uniformity identified as
modem in theory".18 The "empire of uniformity" is thus established upon the premise that the
sovereign people who establish the constitutional association are already culturally
indifferent members of one society aiming to set up a regular constitutional association with
a single locus of sovereignty. Therefore culture is conceived as relative to a stage of
historical development, not as various within a society. It is "taken for granted that the
unity of constitutional association consists in a centralised and uniform system of legal and
political authority, or clear subordination of authorities, to which all citizens are subject
in some way, and from which all authority derives".19
Having set out the epistemic and foremost historiographic properties of modern
constitutionalism, Tully describes contemporary constitutionalism as a resurgence or
16 Above n 15, 41.
1 7 Above n 15, 58.
18 Above n 15, 82.
19 Above n 15, 83.
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"contrapuntal ensemble"20 of voices which have refused to succumb to modernism's
centralising and suppressive monologic universalism. The survival of these hidden
constitutions within "modern" societies show that the identity of a polity as much as an
individual is - here Tully calls on Wittgenstein - aspectival and dialogic. "Contemporary"
constitutionalism thus comprises those hidden constitutions which historically and
contemporarily deny "modern" constitutionalism the hegemony which the bravura of its
"habitual imperial stance" pretends. Thus, says Tully:21
A contemporary constitution can recognise cultural diversity if it is reconceived as what
might be called a "form of accommodation" of cultural diversity. A constitution should be
seen as a form of activity, an intercultural dialogue in which the culturally diverse sovereign
citizens of contemporary societies negotiate agreements on their forms of association over time
in accordance with the three conventions of mutual recognition, consent and cultural
continuity.
Tully then proceeds to look at historical and contemporary moments of this "diverse
federalism", as he calls it. Examples he gives includes Sir Matthew Hale, as an examplar of
the classical common law,22 Chief Justice John Marshall's recognition of the American
Indian tribes' sovereign status in the Cherokee cases of the 18303 and the Meech Lake
Accord (1992) which attempted to resolve the constitutional impasse then (and still today)
gripping Canada (the defeat of which the author plainly feels deeply). Tully uses these - and
other - examples to show the three conventions of mutual recognition, consent and cultural
20 Above n 15, 100.
21 Above n 15, 30.
22 Tully tends rather to over-generalise - or at least under-investigate - the Anglo-American common law tradition
which he regards as one of the foremost sites of contemporary constitutionalism. In that regard he somewhat
neglects the positivisation of the common law and under-estirnates the complicity of the imperial common law
from the second half of the nineteenth century with modern constitutionalism. The distinction between the
common law in its "classical" and "modern" forms would clarify his position towards the role of the common
law in the history of constitutionalism: see G Postema Jeremy Bentham and the Common Law Tradition (Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1986) and PG McHugh "A Tribal Encounter: The Presence and Properties of Common Law
Thought in the Discourse of Colonisation in the Early-Modern Period" in J Lamb (ed) Voyages and Beaches.
Essaysfrom the David Nicol Smith Symposium 1993 (Hawaii University Press, forthcoming).
23 Marshall uses a classical common law technique in these judgments (see McHugh "A Tribal Encounter" above
n 22) but later American cases taking a modern constitutionalist approach qualify and undermine his court's
recognition of inherent tribal sovereignty by development of a doctrine of Congressional jurisdictional
competence (on which see SL Harring Crow Dog's Case: American Indian Sovereignty, Tribal Law, and United
States Law in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994)). Tully adverts to this
development - which in New Zealand is signified by the events of 1839-40 on one hand and the judgment in Wi
Parata v The Bishop of Wellington (187D 3 NZ Jur (OS) 72, 136: "As the settlers gained the upper hand in the
nineteenth century, the Aboriginal and common law [dialogic] system was overwhelmed by the theory and
practice of modern constitutionalism".
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continuity in operation.24 These, he says, are the conventions of "contemporary"
constitutionalism.
Tully provides a vigourous critique of the residual imperialism of "modern"
constitutionalism and calls for a "contemporary" constitutionalism as a form of on-going
and negotiated dialogue which recognises and affirms rather than extinguishes
differentness. Although his examples are anchored in the Canadian context his constant
references to the position of the First Nations are as appropriately applied to Maori in the
New Zealand. We will come to that recontextualisation in Part IV of this article.
III ENCOUNTERING HISTORIES: LAW AND HISTORY IN THE ANGLO-
SETTLER EMPIRE OF UNIFORMITY
A Aspects
Wittgenstein's notion of the inherency of differentness is fundamental to James Tully's
account of contemporary constitutionalism. No matter how one might try, Tully says, the
terms of constitutionalism are always different to themselves. Moreover as he also
stresses,25 again drawing on Wittgenstein, the view that one holds is always aspectival, a
map or route drawn from one's own experience may not coincide with another's.
It follows, then, that James Tully's view of that array of history which with its events
and speech-acts have formed "modern "constitutionalism is his own. Readers may note that
the text of Part II of this article has reported rather than commented upon the argumentative
route of Strange multiplicity, albeit as a rather high-flying bird's eye view which does not
capture the sophistication and lucid vigour of the author's overland account. As Tully
happily and encouragingly notes, it is possible to pass through the same historical
landscape with a different aspect. For instance, his perspective is a broader one of Western
constitutionalism whereas the view I will offer in this Part is consciously Anglocentric.
For as we turn in this Part to pass by another aspect through the "empire of uniformity" it
will become plain that there are certain reci·rring epistemic and historiographic landmarks
virtually identical to those related by Tully. Despite its monolithic tendencies "modern"
constitutionalism is not an ontological singularity so much as a complex and domineering as
well as compendious tradition of organising the historical and contemporary political
landscape particularly, as Tully shows, in the myriad contexts of inter-cultural encounter.
What is now offered is another aspect, one which is highly complementary and virtually
congruent to that given by Tully. To paraphrase Tully's paraphrasing of Wittgenstein, it is
24 Strange multiplicity. above n 15, 116-136.
25 Strange multiplicity, above n 15, 181-2.
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as though we are to be taken on another tour of the historic cities of Vienna or Cambridge6
but by a different guide.
B The Encountering Histories Project
Essentially James Tully is concerned with the intellectual processes which underlie
prevalent conceptions of non-despotic governance and how that constitutionalism,
whosever it is, responds to cultural encounter and diversity. As the title itself discloses,
that concern with the intellectual consequences of cultural encounter is also central to the
Encountering Histories project. This project involves several academics, including Professor
RA Sharp and Manuka Henare of Auckland University as well as New Zealand's most
eminent scholar in the humanities, Professor JGA Pocock. It looks at the ways in which
different "histories", or (to put it another way) culturally transmitted modes or idioms used
to relate a polity's existence and experience in time and location, encounter and incorporate
the tribal or colonising Other. James Tully's exposition of "modern" constitutionalism gives
one view, another complementary guide through similar terrain is now offered.
The Encountering Histories project starts from the premise that a polity must and will
produce an explanatory history of itself as a not necessarily exclusive but usually
authoritative way of locating itself - its people and their social and political organisation -
in time and territory. Areas of Anglo-settler state activity and relations, in New Zealand
the circumstances of its indigenous people the Maori tribes, have tested the received
explanations of its authority over the islands and have necessitated increases in historical
awareness and critical ability as a result of efforts to legitimize and understand that state's
existence as a continuous political structure.27 New Zealanders are well aware that those
efforts have in the last decade dominated the public space of the polity. It follows that
history is written in and for a political context and will be a matter of public attention.
Consequently the histories generated by a polity organised as a "nation", "people", "tribe" or
"state" as texts and speech-acts say as much if not more of their own contemporaneity as that
of the "past" they are purporting to describe. And as - to state the obvious - political
circumstances change, so also do the character and method (the historiography) of reporting
the past. One can talk of the history of historiography.
The setting of the Encountering Histories project is one in which at least two histories
encounter, the one Anglo-settler and -centric, the other indigenous and itself probably in a
26 The choice of Cambridge has a particular resonance as the influential intellectual figures behind this article,
Maitland, Wittgenstein, Herbert Butterfield, Michael Oakeshott, Professors Quentin Skinner, JGA Pocock, James
Tully and Andrew Sharp and (we will see) Lord Cooke, PC are all Cambridge men. This is a moment,
perhaps, to acknowledge my intellectual gratitude to these figures.
27 This paraphrases JGA Pocock "Civic Humanism and its role in Anglo-American thought" in Politics, Language
and Time, above n 1, 80.
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mosaic of the tribal and pan-tribal. If those histories have been and remain in contest then
that will be a consequence of the political relations amongst the polities, though the fact of
contest will itself require the histories to respond to one another. That response can take
many forms, however, including the exclusive: since the purpose of history is to justify the
polity in time and place, rival sites of political authority may need historical obliteration
rather than confrontation. That certainly was the option which for decades prevailed in
New Zealand history as it was written during this century. For the moment we have been
talking of history as incorporating law, if only because a country's law is certainly part of
its history. Anglo-settler discourse, it will be seen, put history and law on a juridical axis
of sovereignty (and property) which denied the fact of political competition within the
islands between Crown and tribe(s). At present, however, it is enough to say that
Encountering Histories is concerned with the political contexts within which aboriginal
and Anglo-settler histories have encountered one another and the historiographical
consequences of that engagement.
This article - as also the lengthier paper tabled at Tulane University - is interested not
only in "history" but its relation to "law". At the end of the nineteenth century and writing
virtually contemporaneously, Dicey and Maitland insisted that law and history were
separate disciplines. Dicey spoke of lawyers' seeking normative guidance from a world
which "is"28 and, here we turn to Maitland, disclosed by the authority of precedent.29 Both
saw that historians require evidence and are concerned with questions of origin and what
"was", matters which do not strictly concern a lawyer. Dicey and Maitland remind us that
law and history whilst both being concerned with the past serve different purposes, not
least that law is firmly anchored in a problem-resolving present.
The Treaty discourse in New Zealand over the past twenty years has been vigourous
exerting strong demands upon its institutions and participants and consequently upon both
the "law" and "history" the Anglo-settler polity (and the tribe - but that is another story) has
of itself. Though law and history may be separate disciplines, or rather idioms of discourse,
they are part of a larger discourse the pre-eminent demands of which require the past to be
"practical". In other words the past is frequently and most publicly used in New Zealand
today as a means of confronting and resolving contemporary problems of political life:
there would be no debate in New Zealand about the meaning of a treaty-signing ceremony in
1840 were Maori today in something resembling parity in their relations with the dominant
Anglo-settler culture. When court and tribunal are required to resolve contemporary claims
by reference to "the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi" the past is being given a
28 AV Dicey Introduction to the law of the Constitution (10 ed London, Macmillan & Co, 1962) 22.
29 FW Maitland "Why the history of English Law is not written" (1888) in The Collected Papers of Frederic William
Maitland (3 vols, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1911) Vol 1, 491.
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serviceable function in the present. Lawyers and historians may diverge at the point noted
by Maitland and Dicey and it is certainly true that the common law is highly ahistorical,
able to collapse in the space of a single judicial breath the temporality between two and two
hundred years.30 However there is also a point where law and history reconverge and that
is where the past becomes (as it is in New Zealand today), in Michael Oakeshott's term,
"practical".
Oakeshott identified three attitudes towards the past: the practical, the scientific and the
contemplative. A practical approach understands the past "merely in relation to ourselves
and our own current activities":31
The practical man reads the past backwards. He is interested in and recognizes only those
past events which he can relate to present activities. He looks to the past in order to explain
his present world, to justify it, or to make it a more habitable and less mysterious place. The
past consists of happenings recognized to be contributory or non-contributory to a subsequent
condition of things, or to be friendly or hostile to a desired condition of things.
A scientific attitude towards the past, on the other hand, is concerned "not with past
events in relation to ourselves and to the habitableness of the world, but in respect of their
independence of ourselves". This is "history" properly speaking:32
In the "historian's" understanding of events, just as none is "accidental", so none is "necessary"
or "inevitable". What we can observe him doing in his characteristic inquiries and utterances
is, not extricating general causes or necessary and sufficient conditions, but setting before us
the events (in so far as they can be ascertained) which Inediate one circumstance to another.
A contemplative attitude towards the past, like the practical, is really a means of living
in the present and is illustrated by the so-called "historical novelists" such as Tolstoy with
War and Peace. This approach is concerned with present events which have been concluded
to have taken place. Oakeshott stresses that to remember and to contemplate a memory are
two different experiences; in the one past and present are distinguished whereas in the other
(contemplative mode) no distinction is made.33
30 W Murphy 'The Oldest Social Science? The Epistemic Properties of the Common Law" (1991) 54 MLR 182, esp
200-1.
31 M Oakeshott "The Activity of being an Historian" in Rationality in Politics and other essays (London, Methuen &
Co, 1962) 137, 147 and 149.
3 2 Above n 31, 148 and 157.
3 3 Above n 31, 149.
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For lawyers whose profession is problem-solving in the present the past must always be
practical34 whilst for many others in the political arena (including the academy) although
not speaking and ostensibly participating in the legal idiom, the past is equally as practical.
When a commentator insists that "history should not be permitted to dictate the outcome of
current disputes and to determine the substance of the Treaty of Waitangi"35 he is not
speaking of history in an Oakeshottian sense but is objecting to the consequences of others'
practical use of the past, the Court of Appeal most especially. This is also the underlying
tactic of those whom Professor Andrew Sharp has described as "vulgar historians".36
Stuart Scott's The Travesty of Waitangi: Towards Anarchy (1995) has nothing whatsoever
to do with history - or scholarship, for that matter - but it is a crass and unsophisticated
text which regards the past as practical in order to nullify its practicality in other hands.
The contest is one about the habitability of the present and in that argument the past is a
practical tool to be exploited or neutralised.
It is conceivable however and as Professor Pocock has reminded us that there might be
forms of history which are self-reflective and unpreoccupied with or at least unresponsive
to the demands of the present.37 Instead of a present instructing or re-educating its past,
moulding it to a set of demands, concepts and organising principles unknown to it, it may be
possible to listen to the past learning its uncertainties and doubts, its differences and
similarities, its essential though not identical humanity. This form of history - what
Oakeshott and Pocock at least would call history - will occur, if at all, within the academy
where the past can be removed from the hubbub of its practical role, though its appearance
there is neither inevitable nor attention-drawing.38 But self-reflective history may be
difficult if not impossible where the past has such a pressing presence as it does in relation
to the Treaty of Waitangi and the political circumstances of New Zealand during the past
twenty-five years. "Law" and "history", then, may share a practical attitude towards the
past notwithstanding the careful distinction drawn by Dicey and Maitland:39 apparent
differences in method may disguise an underlying similarity of didactive purpose.
34 Above n 31, 147 where Oakeshott identifies the legal profession as immersed in the practicality of the past.
35 J McGuire "A theory of a more coherent approach to eliciting the meaning of the Treaty of Waitangi" [1996]
NZU 116, 117.
36 RA Sharp "Politics, rangatiratanga and history in New Zealand-Aotearoa" (paper presented to the Conference
for the Study of Political Thought, Tulane University, 23 March 1996).
37 JGA Pocock "The historian as political actor, in polity, society and academy" (paper presented to the Conference
for the Study of Political Thought, Tulane University, 22 March, 1996).
38 Oakeshott "The Activity of Being an Historian", above n 31, 159 reminds us that the activity of being an
historian "is not a gift bestowed upon the human race, but an achievement"; similarly Pocock "The historian as
political actor", above n 1, 17.
39 Oakeshott, above n 31, 157-8 gives Maitland as an example of an 'historian".
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So from that prolegomenon to Encountering Histories let us consider those themes - the
relation of law and history, how the political contexts of cultural and racial encounter
shape law and histories which explain and legitimate state authority and how those idioms
themselves metamorphise as the contexts within which they are produced change. The
discourse within which we are located, of course, is that of the Anglo-settler polity.
C Law and History: Subjugation and Subjecthood
Questions about the origin and character of state power have dominated New Zealand's
political landscape during the past two decades as a result of the claims made by Maori
under the Treaty of Waitangi. The Anglo-settler state of New Zealand we know to be
embodied in that organising concept of state power - the Crown. The Crown was hardly a
Maori contrivance and it is against this entity that their claims have been and continue to
be made.40 Ultimate power is given constitutional expression through the common law's
doctrine of parliamentary supremacy - the Crown(in-Parliament) as Leviathan.
Public exploration of the character of Crown sovereignty is hardly a novel experience
in the history of Anglo-American political thought. However the urgency of such questions
is a function of the political circumstances in which the state finds itself. The New Zealand
of the 19709 saw those questions being raised directly: the country faced balance of
payments problems which with the oil crisis compromised its highly protected agricultural
economy. Britain's entry into the European Community in 1972 unsettled the Anglo-settler
state's old, fireside Whig Dream of a tranquil former colony, the cultural clone of a mother
country to which its connection had seemed umbilical. Maori claims resurfaced and added
to the sense of disturbance being felt by the formerly complacent Anglo-settler state. These
claims emerged as a localised civil rights discourse clearly linked to the more
internationalised processes of decolonisation and self-determination. The Land March
1975 is often taken as the major activating political event.41 These political circumstances
put before the Anglo-settler state an issue which for the most part of its experience had been
neglected - the origin and nature of Crown sovereignty over the country.
Until the mid-1970s it could be said that the orthodox accounts of Crown sovereignty
over New Zealand were complacent and apron-strung to an Anglocentric tradition which
40 The privatisation policies of state management dismantling and hiving off state (Crown) activity to independent
bodies suggest a broader concept resembling European Law's "emanations of the state" doctrine may become
more suitable for tribal claims rather than an outmoded notion of the Crown. On the notion of an "emanation
of the state" see Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 1651 (ECJ) and Foster v
British Gas [1990] IRLR 353 (ECJ) and on the difficulties of arguing common law aboriginal rights against
public bodies not "of the Crown" see Quebec (Attorney-General) v Canada (National Energy Board) (1994) 3 CNLR
49 (SCC) (Crown's fiduciary duty did not extend to the National Energy Board but was a "relevant
consideration" in their decision-making procedure).
41 Sharp "Politics, rangatiratanga and history", above n 12.
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emphasized the growth of the representative institutions of governance.42 That Whig
tradition was itself an historic phenomenon which had been transplanted into a New
Zealand setting almost without prethought as part of the epistemic baggage naturally
accompanying the colonial Anglo-settler state. That is, the Anglo-settler polity brought
with it an explanation or narrative of state power - a way of knowing governance - which
was directly associated with mid- to late-nineteenth century English discourse. Dealing
with that legacy has become a major theme of contemporary political life in New Zealand.
Through the second half of the nineteenth century law and history, which previously
had been woven into a unified tradition of thought disengaged so that two separate though
orthodox and complementary accounts of Crown sovereignty prevailed in the English polity
- one an historical explanation, the other legal. That distinction between an historical and
legal validation of Crown sovereignty was in the nineteenth century a recent one, as we
know from Professor Pocock's work on the ancient constitution.43 But it was one which
was made possible by the consolidation of the political settlements of the late seventeenth
and early eighteenth century, symbollised by 1745's bloody farewell to the Jacobite menace
when the need to defend the Hanoverian settlement fell off the ideological agenda. More
immediately, the late nineteenth century separation of law and history into distinct
legitimating accounts of Crown sovereignty was itself a reflection of what was then
happening in the professional and academic spheres - a positivising legal practice and a
broad, compendious humanities and civics tradition compartmentalising into separate
chairs and faculties of the academy.44 The dominant Whig element of that tradition, itself a
loose and variegated dynamic amalgam of inter alia law and history, thus left the Crown in
England and, by intellectual transplantation, New Zealand with two separate though
complementary accounts of its sovereignty. Idiomatically the Crown's sovereignty had its
legal and its historical explanations.
The legal account of Crown sovereignty handed down to generations of lawyers by
Albert Venn Dicey took distinct features of the common law episteme: an ahistoricised
assertion of Crown sovereignty which stressed not only its incontrovertibility but its
absolute character. Leviathan's5 presence was always exactly that - unoriginable and
42 PG McHugh "The historiography of New Zealand's Constitutional History" in PA Joseph (ed) Essays on the
Constitution (Wellington, Brooker's, 1995) 344.
43 JGA Pocock The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Low: A Study of English Historical Thought in the 17th
Century (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1957).
44 J Kenyon The History Men. The Historical Profession in England since the Renaissance (2 ed, London, Weidenfield
and Nicolson, 1993) 149-208.
45 For the influence of Hobbes see M Francis "The nineteenth century theory of sovereignty and Thomas Hobbes"
(1980) 1 History of Political Thought 517.
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deemed always to have been present. That omnipresence was regarded as an attribute of
Leviathan's absolute power. Although that legal orthodoxy has been question-marked by
commentators ranging from the radical6 to those soon to become judicial,7 its predicate -
the supremacy of the Crown-in-Parliament - remains part of New Zealand law.
The most notable attempt by a constitutional lawyer to explain the legitimacy of the
Anglo-settler polity in relation to Maori remained caught by the predicates of the paradigm.
In explaining why lawyers regarded the Crown's sovereignty as always and simply being
"there", Professor FM Brookfield echoed Burke in emphasizing the legitimating effect of the
passage of time.48 However in the end this approach no more than reiterated the point that
in a modern(ist) episteme and whatever the disturbances of a colonial past, the Crown's
sovereignty was legally regarded as beyond refutation. Professor Brookfield's argument
was an elaborate if critical circle described entirely within and implicitly reaffirming the
very paradigm he seemed to be chiding. The Crown's sovereignty remained beyond any
validation by historical proof - "time" (which is but a variant on Burkean immemoriality)
had confirmed Crown sovereignty and demonstrably Leviathan's power was there.49
The inability of the lawyers to generate a convincing explanation of Crown sovereignty
responsive to the political circumstances of New Zealand from the late 1970s was an
intellectual legacy of generations of political development in England half a globe away.
Small wonder the initiative to construct a more responsive legitimating account of Crown
sovereignty belonged to the historians.
The historical tradition with which the historians had to deal in the late 1970s was in
many regards also a product of the classical common law in the Burkean sense of
immemoriality. Constitutional law and state-centred history had both after all emerged
46 See the account in Sharp Justice and the Maori, above n 5,249-265.
47 S Elias "The Treaty of Waitangi and Separation of Powers in New Zealand" in BD Gray and RB Mcaintock
(eds) Courts and Policy: Checking the Balance (Wellington, Brookers, 1995) 206.
48 "The New Zealand Constitution: the Search for Legitimacy" (September 1985) in IH Kawharu (ed) Waitangi
Maori and Pakeha Perspectives of the Treaty of Waitangi (Auckland, Oxford University Press, 1989) 1-24.
Professor Brookfield has subsequently developed this theme of the legitimating effect of time in "Maori Rights
and Two Radical Writers: Review and Response" [1990] NZU 406; "Kelsen, the Constitution and the Treaty"
above n 15; "The Treaty, the 1840 Revolution and Responsible Government" (1992) 5 Canterbury Law Review
59; and "Parliament, the Treaty, and Freedom - Millenial Hopes and Speculations" in PA Joseph (ed) Essays on
the Constitution (Wellington, Brookers, 1995) 41. Also the comments of the Minister in Charge of Treaty
Negotiations, the Hon D Graham to Rotary Clubs, Waikanae, New Zealand New Zealand Herald 4 May 1995
citing Professor Brookfield in which the Minister insists the Crown's sovereignty is a legal fact unconnected and
unconnectable to the Treaty of Waitangi.
49 For a similar conclusion see Sharp Justice and the Maori, above n 5,268.
CONSTrTUTIONAL VOICES 515
from the Whig tradition.50 The monumental historical accounts of Crown sovereignty in the
realm written during the nineteenth century by Macaulay, Stubbs and Hallam stress in
various ways the ancientness, the immemorial character of Crown sovereignty.51 This, of
course, is the Whig historical tradition and its governing theme is that of the immortal
continuity of English historical experience, the venerability of the Crown's sovereignty
most especially. That tradition was re-enacted in the New Zealand setting through the
work of such post-War historians as McClintock2 and Morrell3 wherein the Burkean
mist enshrouding the English polity and its sovereign Crown becomes transformed into an
antipodean long white cloud.
Those old Whig histories of the Anglo-settler polity in New Zealand typically use
anatomical metaphors in a Truby King report of that polity's historical experience. The tale
is one of passage to independent statehood and that is described as one of natural growth.
We are told of the "young"/"nascent"/"fledgling" colony "progressing" on to adolescent
Dominion status before "maturing" into full statehood with adoption of the Statute of
Westminster in 1947. This is a form of history which tells the Anglo-settler polity that if it
has a history it is one of a normal, happy childhood or, in other words and as Professor
Pocock noted in opening the Conference for the Study of Political Thought, a history in
which little has happened (save the predictable growth of the Anglo-settler institutions of
representative governance). Here the historian has become the Plunket nurse.
We can see readily today that this old Whig history marginalises Maori and denies the
Treaty of Waitangi any foundational status and constitutional presence: it is a
"presentist'·54 and self-congratulatory tale of preordained growth wherein the past has no
option but to produce Leviathan's glorious adult present. Maori are irrelevant, the problem
50 See Kenyon The History Men, above n 44, 41-87; also JW Burrow A Liberal Descent: Victorian Historians and
the English Past (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981).
51 See JW Burrow, above n 50.
52 Crown Colony Government in New Zealand (Wellington, Government Printer, 1958).
53 The Provincial System in New Zealand, 1852-76 (London, Longmans, Green, 1932).
54 "Whiggish history is the characteristic genre of presentist historiography. It characteristically begins by taking
an institution or an idea from the present together with the contemporary role, function or purpose presently
used to justify that institution or idea, and then describes its historical development as ¢ this purpose or role had
governed its emergence and transformation right from its origin onwards. Or, if whiggish history deals with
something absent in or remote from the present, it does so by accounting for that institution or practice in
categories totally foreign to it, as f these understandings ideally should have been available to the past, were it
not for the 'limits of that age', while neglecting the categories used by the agents in that past to describe
themselves and their own practices and institutions. Whiggish history hinges on this possibility of re-educating
the dead on presumably timeless matters, forcing them to provide answers to questions that are ours." (J
Bartleson A Genealogy of Sovereignty (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995) 57). Presentism is the
organising tendency of those with a practical approach towards the past.
--
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presented by their cultural difference no more than a hiccup in "national" growth. And so
the Maori and Pakeha actors of the past are bound in by the unstoppable, progressive
forces of history.
This type of old Whig history of New Zealand with its reassuring fireside tone has
other effects beside what we see now as its glaring marginalisation of Maori. Whereas the
legal account of Crown sovereignty is an act of emplacement, the historical account is a
complementary form of justification for the Angle)-settler state. Law emplaces Leviathan
whose continued presence is justified as that of the eternal pater familias. This old Whig
history thus provides a legitimating account of state power which entirely fills and subdues
- colonises - the public space. Its thrall is so complete that history has (in the Fukuyama
sense55 reached its end as liberal democracy establishes itself in the New Zealand islands,
a natural historical culmination of such narrative power that it is impossible to conceive of
national history beyond that process.56 In that way national history remains domesticated,
transforming the atomised social setting of Arcadian frontierism of the nineteenth century57
into the retreat into the suburbia of the twentieth century centralised state.
There is no more poetic example of that than the ending of The Piano when Ada (played
by Holly Hunter) and Baines (Harvey Keitel) leave behind the turbulence of the colonial
frontier - the oppressive weather and seas of mud midst the charred dankness of the
colonists' crude slash and burn agriculturalism, the violence, the cultural and sexual
contests - for the weatherboarded seclusion of suburban Nelson. The former is too
dangerous and life-threatening, whilst the latter is comfortable and reassuring. In this safe
domestic space history, so much as one can contemplate it happening, is destined to be
tranquil and uneventful. As Ada deliberately falls from a Maori canoe laden with a piano
(a graphic metaphor for histories in contest) and drowning contemplates her options, we are
left in no doubt that there is a choice - life or death. And life means the domestic,
homogenised and sedate, a place where history does not happen, a place from which
contingency has been removed:58 suburban Nelson. But (to continue the cinematic theme)
from Beaut<ful Creatures and Once Were Warriors we know that this suburbia refuses to be
55 F Fukuyama The End of History and the Lost Man (New York, Macmillan, 1992)
56 For instance PA Joseph "Introduction" to Essays on the Constitution, above n 48,24.
57 M Fairbum The Ideal Society and its Enemies. The Foundation of Modern New Zealand Society 1850-1900
(Auckland, Auckland University Press, 1989).
58 In her opening comments in the notes appended to the pubhshed screenplay J Campion The Piano (London,
Bloomsbury Books, 1993) says at 135: "I think that it's a strange heritage that I have as a panic New
Zealander, and I wanted to be in a position to touch or explore that. In contrast to the original people in New
Zealand, the Maori people, who have such an attachment to history, we seem to have no history, or at least
not the same tradition. This makes you start to ask, 'Well, who are my ancestors?' My ancestors are English
colonizers - the people who came out like Ada and Stewart and Baines."
-i-..- il-
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colonised as the domestic space itself becomes the locus of the contingency eliminated from
national history. The Plunket nurse is now a social worker.
The political circumstances of the 1970s ensured that the old Whig historical narrative
of the Anglo-settler polity with Leviathan as beneficient paterfamilias discharging a nation
from the anxiety of historical contingency would not go unchallenged. If anything, those
political imperatives have been magnified over the past decade as Maori claims assumed a
more dominant position on the agenda of national life.
It was thus left to history, an idiom much less epistemically hamstrung than law, to
address the shortcomings of the orthodox explanations of Crown sovereignty with their
complementary themes of incontrovertibility (law) and beneficient patriarchy (old Whig
history). Through the 1980s histories were written which sought to give the Treaty of
Waitangi the foundational status it so visibly lacked in the old Whig histories. The two
most notable and influential examples of that new history were Claudia Orange's book The
Treaty of Waitangi (1986) and the reports of the first Waitangi Tribunal (1977-1988).59
Yet both of these influential new histories were continuations of rather than
disengagements from a Whig historiographical tradition. That tradition has at its heart, of
course, the explanation and legitimation of state power as exercised by the Crown-in-
Parliament (as supplemented by royal prerogative) and that, essentially, was the function of
Claudia Orange's and the first Waitangi Tribunal's histories. The "new Whig" histories of
the mid-1980s were essentially attempts to re-legitimate Crown authority over Maori and
were eminently practical in character.
In these "new Whig" histories of Claudia Orange and the first Waitangi Tribunal the
growth of the Anglo-settler polity remains pre-ordained and the narrative centre, but that
tale has been transformed into one of guilt rather than self-congratulation. History
according to Claudia Orange and the first Waitangi Tribunal has no option other than to
marginalise and oppress and to bring Maori to their contemporary lot. That historical law
demonstrating the exclusion and mistreatment of Maori also renders the contemporary
imperative of state atonement and reparation. Yet atonement and reparation inherently are
an affirmation of extant power relations for they cannot become self-obliteration:
Leviathan was enjoined to make amends but not so as to jeopardise itself. So with Claudia
Orange and, more pronouncedly, the first Waitangi Tribunal's reports one finds presentist,
state-centred history bereft of any historical possibilities beyond an outcome which is
palpably immanent in a past set into an agenda of an utterly contemporary character. With
both Claudia Orange and the Waitangi Tribunal the past is being used practically.
59 See the account of the first Tribunal's jurisprudence in RA Sharp Justice and the Maori: Maori Claims in New
Zealand Political Argument in the 19805 (Auckland, Oxford University Press, 1990) 73-85.
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What makes these mid-'80s histories so Whig in orientation is also the use of the
historiographic fiction of the polity founded in contract. The Treaty of Waitangi becomes
not a forgotten precursor to Leviathan's presence, but takes a constitutive and foundational
basis to become the deliberative origin of the Anglo-settler state. The first Waitangi
Tribunal and Claudia Orange thus step backward in Whig historiographic time from
Burke's immortal continuity of the polity to a Lockean contract which becomes the source
and ongoing measure of Crown governance.60 History becomes depicted in terms of the
Crown's subscription to or, more usually, its neglect of this contract.
The Claudia Orange and first Waitangi Tribunal histories commanded public attention
during the mid- to late-1980s because they caught the political context and mood of the time.
The "contract" between the Crown and Maori tribes of which they spoke was not the
lawyer's bargain between rational, notionally equal individuals but that of the politicised
commentator seeking to explain the vertical relationship of Crown and subject - the very
relationship lying at the heart of the Whig tradition. A vertical relationship is one of
domination and subjection. In returning to a Lockean contract Claudia Orange and the first
Tribunal were taking with them a guilt-ridden liberal Anglo-settler sentiment and, more
opportunistically (for fundamentally this was a discourse which remained Anglocentric),
Maori. They were attempting to redefine the conditions in and upon which Leviathan's
authority over Maori was based, what might be described as a movement from subjugahon
to subjecthood. This, it should be added, is not to down-grade the importance of Claudia
Orange's pioneering and scholarly work for it unsettled the historical complacency of the
Anglo-settler population and laid an important basis for the Treaty discourse "to move
beyond guilt".61 But it is to locate her book and its historiography within its own
contemporary context - one still dominated by Leviathan's solipsistic and monologic
discourse of sovereignty, a downward gazing "empire of uniformity".
The reorientation of the Whig axis of Anglo-settler state historiography which occurred
during the mid-1980s might be more simply described as occurring within a political context
of Maori claims against the Crown which were formulated within the verticalised context
of subjecthood. That context had two related features: first, it encouraged a pan-Maori
discourse, a chorus of Maori and sympathetic Pakeha insistence on redress which,
secondly, masked other features of Maori political discourse, notably its tribal and
competitive aspect. The sound of hammering on Leviathan's door had sufficient unison to
obscure the elbowing and jockeying amongst those beating claimant fists.
60 See also Sharp Justice and the Maori, above n 59,85, on the first Waitangi Tribunal: "What vivified the
Tribunal was the idea of reparation for breach of contract".
61 Waiheke Island Report at 41.
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IV CONSTITUTIONAL VOICES IN NEW ZEALAND
A Crown - Tribe Relations: Constitutionalismfrom a Verticalised to a Horizontalised
Context or from Monologue to Dialogue
During the mid-1980s at the same time as Claudia Orange and the first Waitangi
Tribunal were producing their influential though essentially Whig histories, the Court of
Appeal issued a series of judgments the transformative effect of which can be gauged more
fully now nearly a decade later. The context of those judgments was the Government's
proposed corporatisation of state assets, a market-driven economic programme being
launched with the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986. Late in the passage of the legislation
s 9 was added as a result of Maori and Waitangi Tribunal protests that the statutory
scheme might compromise the availability of Crown assets for the claims settlement process.
This section stipulated that nothing in the Act was to be regarded as authorising the Crown
to contravene "the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi". The Court of Appeal's
interpretation of s 9 effectively suspended the corporatisation programme until Crown and
Maori had agreed a formula by which what had been state assets remained available for
subsequent claims settlements. That agreement eventuated in the Treaty of Waitangi (State
Enterprises Act) 1988.
It is possible to characterise the Court's judgments as no more than an interpretative
inquiry into the scope of section 9 and hence bounded by Diceyan orthodoxy. However,
their consequences have been considerably further-reaching. Although the Court's language
makes references to the verticalised, Diceyan constitutionalism it actually uses that as a
means of stepping outside its parameters.
The dominant theme of the judgments is that of"partnership". This involves a commitment
to biculfuralism as well as a common enterprise involving Maori and Pakeha. Those dual
themes require compromise and co-operation between the Treaty partners as the country
deals with past breaches and moves on to honour the Treaty in the future.62 Partnership
places a responsibility on both partners to act towards each other reasonably, honourably,
and with the utmost good faith.63 That relationship, which "creates responsibilities
analogous to fiduciary duties"64 requires the Crown actively to protect Maori interests5
as well as responding reasonably to Tribunal recommendations as part of its duty to
remedy past breaches of the Treaty.
62 [1989] 2 NZLR 513, 530 per Cooke P.
63 [1987] 1 NZLR 641, 664 and 667 (per Cooke P) and 673, 681-2 (per Richardson J).
6 4 Above n 63,664 per Cooke P.
65 Above n 63,664 per Cooke P.
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The judgments draw explicitly upon the common law (here taken to include equity) of
private obligations. For instance:66
[T]here is every reason for attributing to both partners that obligation to deal with each other
and with their treaty obligations in good faith. That must follow both from the nature of the
compact and its continuing application in the life of New Zealand and from its provisions.
No less than under the settled principles of equity as under our partnership laws, the
obligation of good faith is necessarily inherent in such a basic document as the Treaty of
Waitangi. In the same way too honesty of purpose calls for an honest effort to ascertain the
facts and to reach an honest conclusion.
These are principles for the management of an ongoing relationship of notional equality,
but they are those of a private sphere consciously transplanted into the public. The court's
approach was to require the Crown and Maori to negotiate an arrangement by which the
policy of the State-Owned Enterprises Act could be realised with accompanying safeguards
for the Treaty claims process. In other words, the court was not making any ruling so much
as setting parameters for the relationship between Crown and tribe and leaving it to the
parties to manage themselves within that framework. Plainly the court saw that facilitative
rather than determinative function as inherent in the nature of the Treaty relationship:
partners needs must talk, negotiate and through constant dialogue and adjustment agree the
means of living with one another. The court did not impose a settlement on the Crown, and
the major settlements eventually reached in the state enterprises, sea fisheries and Waikato-
Tainui claims were all given effect by statute. In that regard one must reject the allegation
that the court's identification of the "principles of the Treaty of Waitangi" was "political" - a
loaded term implying an undemocratic usurpation of power constitutionally located in the
executive and Parliament.67
The effect of these judgments was to require the Crown to negotiate settlements with the
tribes. At the time of the first Court of Appeal decision in 1987 the signs were that Crown
settlement of Maori claims would be begrudging and meagre68 and that the Crown would
move at its own slight pace in resolving the claims. The Crown appeared to be content to let
the Waitangi Tribunal act as a national conscience, a stance underlined by the Crown's
protestation of its non-adversary position in relation to most claims. If that was the
Crown's tactic it was unseated by the Court of Appeal judgments. Leviathan's own courts
had told it to speak, negotiate and make deals with a group of its citizenry - the indigenous
66 Above n 63,682 per Richardson J.
67 J McGuire "A theory for a more coherent approach", above n 35, 118-20.
68 See Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment Environmental Management and the Principles qf the
Treaty of Waitangi: Report on Crown Response to the Recommendations of the Waitangi Tribunal 1983-88
(Wellington, Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environrnent, 1988).
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Maori tribes - on a notional basis of equality and partnership. The major settlements of
recent years - the state enterprises settlement mechanism, Sealord fisheries agreement and the
Waikato-Tainui raupatu settlement - have been a direct outcome of the new political
environment of equal dialogue created by the Court of Appeal judgments. Similarly when in
late 1994 the Crown tried to rein the Treaty discourse by means of a fiscal envelope or
financial limit on the sum available for settlement,69 the tribes responded with a flexing of
political muscle inconceivable a few years before: the verticalised politics of domination
were shown as obsolete in the new political climate generated by the Court of Appeal
judgments. Equality - partnership - once conceded is hard to retract; notions can acquire a
self-fulfilling momentum of their own which may be difficult to slow.
A paradox is that this step, the political consequences of which cannot be under-
estimated,70 occurred totally within a formalist common law paradigm. The Court of
Appeal, like Claudia Orange and the first Waitangi Tribunal, anchored Crown-tribe
relations in contract but with a very significant difference. The Court of Appeal's notion of
contract in the context of Crown-tribe relations is not that of a Lockean, historiographical
and verticalised type but a legal, ahistorical and horizontalised one. The court's
implantation of the Treaty of Waitangi into a horizontalised setting replays contractual
doctrine's movement during the eighteenth through early nineteenth century. During that
period contract went from a verticalised Crown-subject sphere to become a domesticated or
horizontalised means of organising relationships between autonomous, rational political
beings, namely the post-Vienna European states system of treaty-making and, in Victorian
England, the economic liberalism of the common law.71
The novelty, then, of the Court of Appeal judgments is the common law's transfer of its
domesticated, private form into a public context of Crown-tribe relations. As one would
expect with the common law, this does not purport to be an historicised exercise. The court
never pretends that words like "partnership" or "fiduciary" were exchanged on the seaside
promontory at Waitangi in 1840. However, in transforming the tribal voices from a vertical
to a horizontal level beside rather than below the Crown, the court strives towards a
balancing of power relations such as that which existed de facto in New Zealand a century
ago. Leviathan had been made to sit at the table and listen by the same technical means as
that through which he (through his courts) makes his subjects listen to and bargain with one
another.
69 See Wira Gardiner Return to Sender: What really happened at the./iscal envelope hui (Wellington, Reed, 1996).
70 For instance S Elias, QC (as she then was) comments that the Court of Appeal's judgments diffused a situation
which potentially was "almost revolutionary", see "The Treaty of Waitangi and Separation of Powers in New
Zealand", above n 47, 226.
71 PS Atiyah The Rise and Fall ef Freedom of Contract (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979) 39-138.
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The House of Lords' judgment in the Factortame case suspended or (to use the voguish
neologism) "disapplied" an Act of Parliament.72 The Lords evaded the sovereignty issue by
ignoring it.73 The Maori Council cases do virtually likewise despite the occasional aside
references to the sovereignty of the Crown-in-Parliament. Sovereignty is kept almost
completely out of the picture because it is largely unhelpful and unsuited to the practical
requirements of the case. To have kept doggedly to the verticalised view of Crown-tribe
relations would have ignored the coherence and strength of the Maori claims and would not
have taken their resolution much further in the political process. The court was taking as
genuine the Crown's commitment to the claims settlement process which meant sidelining
Leviathan's ethos of dominance. As in England, contemporary political reality
peripheralised the unhelpful strictures of late nineteenth century sovereignty doctrine.
Not only has the character of Crown-tribe relations been affected by the Court of
Appeal judgments but the new political environment of claims settlement has facilitated a
reassertion of the tribal element of Maori discourse That element, of course, has always
been there. However it has only become an important element in national politics since the
transformative Court of Appeal judgments. The profile which that inter-tribality has
obtained itself demonstrates the process of horizontalisation.
Leviathan's monologic empire of uniformity, as Tully would style it, or, by the writer's
aspect, the constraints of a vertical relationship allowed a whitened, homgenised view of
the national political culture. Even - indeed, most especially - in the "claims culture" of the
1980s that view remained, although the tone of Anglo-settler history had changed from self-
congratulation into guilt. But in the new culture of negotiated settlement Anglo-settler
discourse can no longer present itself through (mc,dernist) notions of sovereignty in its
vigorous encounter with Maori. Instinctively and solipsistically used to seeing the
political world on its own fixed and closed terms, the Anglo-settler polity is confused by a
discourse of diversity which refuses to fawn when Leviathan taps its sceptre. In other
words, Anglo-settler discourse is so used to imprinting its own terms on Maori that it is
oblivious to the process in reverse.
72 R v Secretary of State.for Transport, ex parte Factortame (No. 2) [1991] AC 603 and see most recently R v Secretary
of State, ex parte Equal Opportunities Commission [1994] 2 WLR 409.
73 Wade (1991) 107 LQR 1.
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Tribal history, we have been told, is based upon the pursuit of mana within a highly
competitive, tribalised Polynesian society.74 What we know of tribal historiography seems
to reflect that competitiveness. Certainly it is one which animates the history of what
appears to be an Anglo-settler institution, the Maori Land Court. Historically this Court
has been as important a forum for inter-tribal competition as an instrument for Anglocentric
assimilation. The Maori tribes have demonstrated that they have been perfectly capable of
appropriating the devices of another culture, the seemingly dominant and by some accounts
smothering one, and injecting their own history into it. That this would occur is no surprise
in that Maori culture has a highly ritualised and rhetorical sense of discourse and conflict
management a tendency displayed on the marae and by their apparent litigiousness today
and, historically (we will see) in Judith Binney's Redemption Songs.
One senses that Maori discourse, not least the history it has of itself (at least from the
mid-nineteenth century), with its sense of competition and conflict contained by ritual, has a
robust and pragmatic sense of the opportunistic character of political life, a Namier-like75
quality alien to Whig history with its narrative momentums, its "tide of events", grand
sweeps, normative principles and historical "laws". Recently Maori representatives have
talked freely about the fisheries settlement as "a tide that had to be taken at the flood",76
with an eye towards existent commercial opportunities. They acknowledge an
opportunistic element in their relations with the Crown brazenly and unabashedly in a
way which Pakeha politicians committed to a rhetoric of "principled" politics and the
redemptive state try to avoid. The overt opportunism of Maori claims may make Pakeha
bristle. Yet like the rhetoric and litigation it may be no more than a reflection of qualities
inherent in Maori political discourse, an expression of the bustle and jockeying character of
the competition for mana. The Treaty discourse, after all, is one which straddles culturally-
specific sites such as the marae and the court room and one must expect features intrinsic to
74 Notably in the work of A Parsonson "The Expansion of a Competitive Society: A Study in 19th Century Maori
Social History" (1980) 14 New Zealand Journal of History 45; "The Pursuit of Mana" in WH Oliver (ed) The
Oxford History of New Zealand (Oxford, Clarenden Press, 1981) 140 as qualified in "The Challenge to Mana
Maori" in GW Rice (ed) The Oxford History of New Zealand (2 ed, Auckland, Oxford University Press, 1992)
167.
75 Namierite history takes it name from Sir Lewis Namier who argued in hostile opposition to the Whig tradition
that the ideas and principles of eighteenth century politicians were merely rationalizations of ambition: see HI
Dickinson Liberty and Property: Political Ideology in Eighteenth Century Britain (London, Methuen, 1977) 2-10.
Namierite history, in its least cynical form, views history as a typology of power; an historiography with
similarity to a Maori historiography of the pursuit of mana.
76 The phrase used by the Maori negotiators to justify the $NZ150 million Sealord Deal (1992). See J Munro 'The
Treaty of Waitangi and the Sealord Deal" (1994) 24 VUWLR 389 which analyses the sea fisheries settlement as
a pragmatic arrangement incompatible with the judicially and Tribunal articulated "principles of the Treaty of
Waitangi". This article highlights the differences in the ethos of settlement from that of the "principled" context
of claims.
524 (1996) 26 VUWLR
those sites to filter into the wider, public discourse. Maori leaders such as Tipene O'Regan
and Robert Mahuta are canny as well as charismatic men with the sharpness to regain and
enhance tribal mana as the opportunities arise.
In New Zealand/Aotearoa today we are seeing, it is suggested, the "indigenization of
discourse". That Anglo-settler discourse has exhausted its capacity to contain and explain
the national political culture is disclosed by feeble Pakeha commentators imagining the
country is heading "towards anarchy". Indeed the usually witless Stuart Scott displays
unknowing prescience when he blanches at the comment by Temm QC (as he then was) that
"as we approach the next century assimilation seems to be the ultimate result, but not the
way our grandfathers foresaw it; it is likely that instead of the pakeha assimilating the
Maori, it will turn out that the Maori might assimilate the pakeha".77 What disturbs Scott
is not the prospect of anarchy so much as the fear of Maori gaining meaningful political and
economic power of the type signalled by the fisheries and Tainui settlements. The "empire of
uniformity" has lost dominance and so too has its accompanying and cosy domesticated
conjunction of law and history.
We might further consider the character of Treaty discourse during the past two decades
by more specific reference to James Tully's antithesis of "modern" and "contemporary"
constitutionalism. Using his approach it could be said that the Maori Council cases
recognise and, indeed, insist upon the three conventions of "contemporary"
constitutionalism: mutual recognition, consent and continuity. The Court of Appeal
recognises the political status of Maori organised as tribes with legitimate claims against
the Crown. Partnership, after all, is a form of mutual recognition and common enterprise.
The Treaty relationship becomes seen as one in which relations between Crown and tribe
are continually reassessed and negotiated on the basis of consent rather than unilateral
imposition. That relation is one which accommodates and facilitates cultural diversity
whilst also acknowledging that Maori rights may in some cases have to defer to an
overriding national weal (such as conservation). In other (Tully) words, the Court of
Appeal formulates the relationship between Crown and tribe(s) as dialogic and aspectival.
There is no insistence upon the culturally undifferentiated uniformity implicit in modern
constitutionalism and the strict dogma of unitary sovereignty has been put to the periphery.
The Maori Council jurisprudence represents a form of what James Tully would recognise as
"contemporary" constitutionalism. Similarly the fiscal envelope fiasco amounted to an
abortive attempt by the Crown to restore modernism to the Treaty discourse.
77 Quoted in S C Scott The Travesty of Waitangi.· Towards Anarchy (Dunedin, Campbell Press, 1995).
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B Judith Binney's Redemption Songs: A Life of Te Kooti Arikirangi Te Turuki78
Part I and II of this article showed how law and history have colluded in Anglo-settler
discourse to imbue the state with juristic and historical impregnability. Law and history
have given the "empire of uniformity" a monologic, solipsistic and self-legitimating voice
whatever the character of its tone - self-congratulatory and triumphalist or beratory:
Leviathan can neither countenance any form of political association nor conceive any
history or law occuring within his territory but his own. However as the historical and
continued reality of Maori political organisation demonstrated by Judith Binney's fine
book and the Court of Appeal judgments indicate, the fiction of exclusiveness generated by
"modern" (late nineteenth century Whig) constitutionalism is exactly that - a fiction. The
Court of Appeal judgments over the past decade, including its most recent one on the
apportionment of the fisheries settlement income,79 show a contemporary historiography of
dialogue and negotiation. The state (Crown) remains a vital, indeed central player in this
new historiography but its function is less the vindication of paramount political power
(inherent though that may be in the fact of judgment in the Crown's courts). Rather the Court
has facilitated dialogue amongst the political entities - tribes and Crown - in a setting where
encounter is inevitable and the terms of mutual co-existence require continual negotiation
and reassessment.
Judith Binney's important book Redemption Songs gives a view of New Zealand history
in the late nineteenth century wherein a similar theme of encounter recurs but that theme is
an incidental rather than central element of the book. To have dwelt upon encounter would
have transformed Binney's book into something which demonstrably it is not and does not
want to be, namely a history of colonialism. The book is concerned with the history of
Maori politics in a colonial setting and the centre of its narrative is tribal society rather
than the arriviste state. Although the book is a biography of Te Kooti Arikirangi Te Turuki
its subject is really the character of Maori politics in the central North Island during the
late nineteenth century and into the twentieth. In that regard we soon realise that Te Kooti
is one of those protean and ethereal characters more revealing in the responses he prompts
from others than in his own elusive regard. Moving as effectively as he does across tribal
and colonial politics Te Kooti becomes the means for their depiction.
Redemption Songs relates Te Kooti's banishment to Wharekauri (Chatham Island) with
the whakarau whose status as political prisoners is clearly established. The prisoners'
escape, Te Kooti's attack on the Matawhero settlers in Poverty Bay, the siege of Ngatapa
and his subsequent fleeing from the forces of retribution are all described in minute detail.
78 Auckland University Press and Bridget Williams Books, Auckland, 1995.
79 Te Runanga O Muriwhenua et al v Te Runanganui O Te Upoko O Te Ika Association Inc Unreported, 30 April 1996,
Court of Appeal, CA 155/95.
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Binney is in no doubt that Te Kooti had a take (cause of action) which justified his action in
Poverty Bay and which in subsequent years he sought to vindicate. In 1873 Te Kooti sought
trial in England insisting that only there could a fair trial be obtained. This offer came
during his period of shelter under the protection of King Tawhiao in the Rohe Potae of
Ngati Maniapoto, a fugitive period which was followed by his eventual pardon and
establishment of the Ringatu faith. Throughout this narrative we see Te Kooti as a kind of
free agent admittedly linked by kin and with strong affiliation to particular tribes (Tuhoe
most notably). Te Kooti skates across Maori territory in the central North Island and its
tribal and inter-tribal politics skilfully negotiating the mana of the hereditary chiefs, often
by subtly and at times less subtly undermining it whilst carefully tending and enhancing his
own. Indeed the peripatetic lifestyle of Te Kooti and his followers enables Binney to
display the political complexities and organisation of Maori society in late nineteenth
century Aotearoa. Yet through that minutely related life the character of Te Kooti himself
remains enigmatic and almost mystical. This prophet who refused to be photographed and
whose image survives from a few rough pencilled drawings acquires an aura but never a
personality. What we have is not a political or intellectual biography of a type familiar to
western historians but a history of the politics of mana in the late nineteenth century.
The charismatic Te Kooti's roaming through the world of Maori politics and the
rippling of his prophecies provides a graphic demonstration of the complexity and
coherence of Maori political organisation and discourse in this period. Binney also reveals
the exceptional literacy of Maori society and its capacity to appropriate and indigenise
metaphysical concepts of the Pakeha, the juristic and Biblical most especially. By the early
1880s, some years after the confiscations, the Rohe Potae (encircling boundaries) of Ngati
Maniapoto (as also that of the Tuhoe) remained inviolate territory into which Pakeha
could not enter without invitation. The government had accepted that exclusion and it was
not until a final political settlement was negotiated with Maniapoto and the exiled
Tawhiao of Waikato that the main trunk railway was able to continue southward. Te
Kooti's pardon in 1883 was part of that package. Yet he had earlier predicted the violation
of the Rohe Potae and the devastation it would bring:80
[T]he day will come when the God of the Pakeha will whistle in these places; from far beyond
this house ... continuing right down to it, entering right into the porch of the house and
coming straight through the back of it, and then at once you will see in lines the signs of the
whistling God of the Pakeha along the very lines which stand near this house.
Similarly Te Kooti predicted that the surveying of Tuhoe country would precipitate its
loss, although paradoxically and shortly before his death he tried to pacify the dissension
sparked by the commencement of the surveying.
80 Redemption Songs, above n 78,278.
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However and as observed earlier, this is not a history of colonialism so much as a rich
account of history occurring within a colonial context. The colonial encounter between the
Anglo-settler authorities and the tribes never becomes the central thread. We hear the
monologic voice of the empire of uniformity (which is how Binney tends to depict Pakeha),
most notably in the account of the Pakeha hysteria in Poverty Bay sparked by the prospect
of Te Kooti's visit to his home district in the late 1880s. That account, which includes an
exploration of Goodall v Te Kooti,1 keeps the theme of encounter muted. At times it is almost
as though the mana of the Pakeha is being deliberately understated and left to care for itself.
That however, does not diminish the strength of the book so much as emphasise the aspect
which Binney wishes to keep firmly within Maori discourse of the period. Yet somehow -
and this is a magical paradox of this marvellous book - that gives the colonial encounter
added though never dominant sharpness. Through the detail we become aware as never
before of the coherence and power of Maori political organisation in this period and why
Crown - tribe relations in that period were dialogic in character ex necessitate. Given the
delicacy of the Crown's sovereignty de facto one can well appreciate why in 1877 in Wi
Parata v The Bishop of Wellington82 Leviathan's courts were so anxious to deny the tribes
any status de jure. That picture of contesting and co-existing sovereignties has already been
presented in a text dealing specifically with the colonial encounter in the mid- to late-
nineteenth cenfury, James Belich's The New Zealand Wars. Reading Binney, however, one
realises how Belich sets his account of colonialism at so broad and general a level as to
weaken the picture which Redemption Songs gives less centredly and more powerfully.
Judith Binney's biography of Te Kooti Arikirangi Te Turuki is an extremely important
book. Baroque in its architecture, the book is richly ornate and complex in its development
of themes and sensitivity to the means by which the past is refracted into the present.
Binney is elaborate and careful in creating the settings in which the book's characters - not
least, of course, Te Kooti himself - sing their songs into a future which will hear in its own
setting and with its own needs. The songs and prophecies swirl through varying contexts
within a complex Maori world, acquiring and conferring overlaying and imbricated
meaning as they pass through territory and time. This is monumental history of
extraordinary richness and highly disciplined passion built on a profound
historiographical sensitivity aware that what is being related is not a single history so
much as the generation of multivalent histories within late nineteenth century Maoridom.
The book - for all the care and lavishness of its fine presentation by editor Bridget Williams
- is not an easy read. However its dividends are great. This is history which captures the
81 (1890) 9 NZLR 26 (CA).
82 (1877) 3 NZ Jur (OS) 77.
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mystique of the past whilst also demystifying it. Redemption Songs is a - one is tempted to
call it the - major landmark in New Zealand historiography.
Those non-Maori bewildered by the character of contemporary Maori politics should
read this book to grasp the sophistication, ritualising processes and subtle calibrations of
tribal and inter-tribal discourse. As today Maori politics reassert their presence in the
public domain in a variety of forms and ever-shifting contexts - inter-tribal, intra-tribal and
pan-tribal - there is no reason to believe that Maori discourse is any the less sophisticated
and subtle than the forms of a century ago depicted in Redemption Songs. Nonetheless it
must be stressed that Binney's past is not a practical one, though her journey with Te Kooti
through Maori politics of the late nineteenth century is one which helps us inhabit our own
world.
V CONCLUSION
James Tully and Judith Binney in their separate ways demonstrate the possibility of an
inter-cultural constitutionalism in which political identity is not closed and fixed but open,
negotiable and contested. Whilst giving historical examples, Tully calls this "contemporary"
constitutionalism. That possibility is implicit too in the Court of Appeal judgments in the
state enterprises cases which were so influential in establishing today's political
environment of claims settlement. In many regards the Court of Appeal has created a climate
in which Tully's "contemporary" constitutionalism prevails over the stining "modern"
version. The dominant monologic voice of Leviathan is increasingly unable to suppress the
difference which historically (per Binney's Redemption Songs) and contemporarily refuses
to succumb and, which, remains teeming with life despite "the empire of uniformity"tending
otherwise. That inability will become more manifest as Maori continue to negotiate
substantial settlements which will bring an accompanying growth in economic and political
power. And in that regard it is important to remember that tribes, unlike joint stock
companies or pressure groups, are primarily political rather than economic associations or,
to use Michael Oakeshott again, civic rather than enterprise associations.83
In their separate ways Judith Binney's Redemption Songs and the Court of Appeal
judgments in the state enterprises cases also show that it is possible to write and so to
experience national history without recourse to the grand, underlying "laws of history" and
narrative design which have legitimated the Anglo-settler state. Instead history can be
83 M Oakeshott On Human Onduct (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975) 55. For Oakeshott human associations are
structured as either prudential or moral practices. The former is an enterprise association where the
membership are joined in seeking a common substantive satisfaction, whether it be the profit-maximising goal
of a joint-stock company or a change in human behaviour as with pressure groups like Greenpeace. A moral
or rule-based association is held together not by reason of a common purpose but through the authority of
common practices. See also M Loughlin Public Law and Political Theory (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992) 71-
83.
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written through demonstration of the means by which actors faced with the problem of
living in their own present improvise and compromise, reimagining their past in order to
survive in the present. History then becomes not a seamless tale of a society's progress
towards some imagined destination, a fictionalised political Paradise in which the state and
its institutions share the domestified bliss of its population, but a very human and more
contingent account of continual competition and adjustment. The former type of history, the
Whig history of the Anglo-settler state, is that of the "empire of uniformity", the latter
history a form of Tully's "contemporary" constitutionalism.
The common law has always been a jurisprudence of process, its notion of "rights" being
oriented about procedure84 rather than a Lockean notion of rights as inherent and
substantive and such as one finds in human rights instruments. Listening has been at the
heart of the common law's historical development: one might, for example, reduce the
principles of administrative law to the essential requirement that a decision-maker should
listen genuinely and properly and base their response upon what has been heard. It is
doubtless that element of the common law which enables Tully to identify it as a major
vehicle for "contemporary" constitutionalism.
Yet listening is hard to do when one is used to dominating discourse and has established
the juridical and historiographical means to ensure it. By requiring the Crown to listen to
Maori the Court of Appeal has brought about an environment of political engagement which
has more to do with mana than recourse to the relation of sovereign and subject. The Crown
must establish the mana of its kawanatanga (which must differ from the mana of
rangatiratanga) and that is to be achieved and demonstrated - as the Court of Appeal so
astutely recognised - by listening to and acknowledging mona Maori under the Treaty of
Waitangi. If the emergent constitutionalism in New Zealand/Aotearoa - its law and its
history - becomes one of dialogue and compromise founded upon a willingness to listen to
these constitutional voices and predicated also upon a realisation of the sheer difficulty of
living together on these small islands then the politics of mana can be no bad thing.
84 M Lobban The Common Inw and English Jurisprudence 1760-1850 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991).
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